Ibn Sina and the proof of the truthful
- Updated On Friday, 30 May 2014
- Written by Dr. Mohammad Ali Shomali
- Editor Kawther Rahmani
- Supervisor Sayyed Roohullah Musavi
- Published on Saturday, 05 February 2011
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- Hits: Please explain the way that Ibn Sina introduced the proof of the truthful (burhan al-siddiqin) in proving the existence of God?
Existence is either necessary or contingent. If it were necessary, the object would then proved and if it were contingent, it must lead to the necessary in order for it not to become a vicious circle or an infinite series. The features of this version are as follows: This argument does not need to consider the attributes of creatures unlike the a posteriori (empirical arguments), such as the argument from temporal beginning, the argument from motion and the argument from the soul. These arguments deal with the attributes of creatures and prove temporal beginning, motion and so on, because in the a posteriori arguments, some of the premises are derived from the natural sciences. However, this version is of a totally philosophical nature and all its premises are derived from metaphysics in its general sense, the subject matter of which is existence qua existence. It is worth noting that this version does not need to prove the existence of creatures because its first premise is formulated in the form of an assumption. The premises used for forming the argument are as follows: a) In this argument, the principle of the existence of reality has been taken as indubitable and self-evident. Denial of this premise is regarded as sophistry or scepticism. The principle of the reality of existence cannot be denied or doubted at all. Man accepts his own existence and ideas, and this very acceptance is assumed as accepting objective reality and existence. b) Existence is divided into the Necessary Being and the contingent being and this division (as a rational division) is of a restrictive nature. Existence is either necessary or contingent, and there is no third alternative conceivable other than this. The division revolves around affirmation and negation. The existence of an existent being is either necessarily essential to and inseparable from it, as for example, evenness is inseparable from the number ten, and this is called the Necessary Being; or the existence of an existent being is not essentially necessary and its essence is indifferent to existence and non-existence and separable from it. Such an existent is called a contingent existent. This premise is self-evident; if it is properly understood, it cannot be doubted. It is so evident that it needs no argument. c) Every contingent needs an existentiating (existence-giving) cause, because based upon the definition given of the contingent being, its essence is equal to existence and non-existence, and existence is not a necessity. As long as the existentiating cause has not brought it out of non-existence, it will not come into existence. Thus, every contingent needs an existentiating cause for actualisation. Although this premise is clear and needs no proof, in Islamic philosophy there are certain arguments that have been given for it, and they can be considered an aid for further illustration. However, the premise is self-evident. d) The vicious circle and the infinite regress are impossible. The impossibility of the vicious circle is self-evident. If the subject and predicate are properly understood, the conclusion that a vicious circle and an infinite regress are impossible will be rationally affirmed. The vicious circle means that one existent being in relation to another existent being is at the same time, both a cause and an effect. It is clear from this though that the cause implies needlessness and the effect implies need. The coexistence of needlessness and need at the same time entails contradiction. However, the impossibility of an infinite regress is of a speculative nature and needs to be proved. Numerous proofs have been offered, some of which indicate the impossibility of an infinite regress with respect to all real things, covering actual existents arranged in successive order. Others consider an infinite regress to be impossible only with respect to real, efficient causes. An investigation of the proofs offered in this respect should be sought in its appropriate place, in metaphysics under the heading of causality. Based on the above premises, the argument of Ibn Sina can be explained as follows: The principle of existence or reality is the dividing line between philosophy and sophistry. Any intelligent person affirms the principle of existence and reality, and accepts that there are certain realities. At least, he affirms his existence, mind and ideas. The questions that can be posed are: is this reality necessary? That is, is its existence necessary and inseparable? If not, is it contingent? There is no third alternative conceivable, as dividing existence into the necessary being and the contingent being is restrictive. If the answer to the former question is positive, the object, that is, the Necessary Being, has been proved. If, however, it is the case that existence is not necessary but contingent and, as has been said, the contingent being is indifferent to existence and non-existence, the question then arises as to what cause or preponderating factor has brought it out of non-existence into existence. Were the contingent being by itself capable of emerging from this state of indifference, it would mean that the contingent being was the cause of its own existence and this would lead to a vicious circle. If there is another cause or preponderating factor, let us then move the argument to consider it and ask: is this other cause necessary or contingent? If it is necessary, the object is proved, but if it is contingent, let us then move the argument to its cause or preponderating factor, and so, finally, in order for an infinite regress not to occur, the series of causes must lead to a Necessarily Existent Being. Through this argument, it is proved that there is a Necessarily Existent Being. However, only the principle of existence is proved through this, but the attributes of the Necessary Being are left untouched. Questions such as: is the Necessary Being corporeal or not? Is It one or many, simple or composite? Does It have such attributes of perfection like knowledge or power? And what is the relationship between Its Essence and Its Attributes? These and other similar questions are all posed in metaphysics in its special sense, and finally through a host of arguments, it is proved that the Necessary Being is not corporeal but rather It is one and simple, and possesses all the attributes of perfection, and His attributes of essence are identical with His Essence. Ibn Sina takes much pride in this mode of exposition and demonstration because it was unprecedented among his predecessors, and it is fair to say that his argument is of an original nature. However, Mulla Sadra does not consider this version an ideal one, because despite the fact that creatures are not used as the middle term in this argument, in one respect, it seems to be similar to the argument from temporal origination as it is put forward by the Muslim theologians and the argument from motion as put forward by the naturalists. The reason is that contingency, which is one of the properties of what constitutes the real nature of things, has been used as the middle term. In Addition, Mulla Sadra does not count the Ibn Sinian version among the versions of the proof of the truthful and tries to develop a new version of it. However, the fact that Ibn Sina has placed emphasis on the concept of existence makes his argument closer to the proof of the truthful than the arguments developed by his predecessors. In the path of the truthful, the focus is the reality of existence and not its concept. In this path, God is demonstrated by existence itself, and by His essence His attributes are demonstrated and by His attributes, His acts are demonstrated. The others seek access to that which is other than the reality of existence, such as whatish contingency, the generation of creatures, motion of the body, and so on. In the epilogue to Kitab al-Masha'ir (The Book of Metaphysical Penetrations), Mulla Sadra refers to a proof, which he calls (burhan al-siddiqin): "Know that the paths towards God, the Exalted, are multiple, because He possesses innumerable excellences and aspects. "Everyone has a direction to which he turns" (2:148). However, some of these paths are more luminous, nobler, more rigorous and can be more cogently demonstrated. The most trustworthy and noblest of them leading to Him, His attributes and acts, is that in which the middle term of demonstration is no other than Himself. Therefore, the path [entails] going to the object of the quest from the object of the quest, because He is the proof for all things. This is the path of all the Prophets and the Sincere, May God's peace be upon them all. "Say: This is my way. I call to Allah, I and those who follow me being certain, and glory be to Allah, and I am not one of the polytheists" (12:108). "This is indeed in the former scriptures, the scriptures of Abraham and Moses" (87:18-19). Thus, this [group] are those who attest to Him, the Exalted, through Him. "Allah bears witness that there is no God but He" (3:18). Then, they attest to His attributes through His Essence, then (attest to) His attributes, and from His attributes to His acts and effects, one after the other.' 'Others seek to make their way towards the knowledge of God and of His attributes through what is other than Him. All the philosophers seek access to Him through the contingency of things, the naturalists through the motion of the body and the theologians through the temporality of created things and so forth. These are also proofs and evidences; however, the former path is stronger and nobler. The Divine Book alludes to those paths and He, Exalted be He, says, "Soon We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in their souls until it becomes manifest unto them that He is the Real" (41:53), and he alluded to this path when He said, "Is it not sufficient that your Lord is a Witness to all things?"' (41:53) It is worth noting that Sadra means Ibn Sina where he says,'The philosophers seek access to Him through the contingency of things...'