Allamah Tabataba'i and the proof of the truthful
- Updated On Monday, 26 May 2014
- Written by Dr. Mohammad Ali Shomali
- Editor Kawther Rahmani
- Supervisor Sayyed Roohullah Musavi
- Published on Saturday, 05 February 2011
- Hits: 617 views
- Hits: How did Allamah Tabataba'i introduce the proof of the truthful in proving God? What privileges does it have compared to his predecessors?
Allamah Tabataba'i has propounded the argument of the truthful without employing the premises used in the other versions. In this version, there is no need even for the fundamentality of existence. Thus, it can be considered an original version of the ontological argument within Islamic metaphysics. In his gloss upon these words of Mulla Sadra, 'As has been said, existence is a single simple objective reality,' Allamah Tabataba'i writes: 'And this [objective reality] is the reality through which we reject sophistry and find that every sensible person is compelled to affirm it. It does not accept unreality or non-existence in itself; even supposing its unreality and non-existence necessitates its subsistence and existence. If we assume at a certain time, or absolutely, the unreality of whatever is real, and then if all reality really becomes unreal, it means that reality subsists. Likewise, if the sophist sees things as illusory or doubts their reality, they are really illusory and their reality is really dubious for him. It means that the negation of reality entails its affirmation. If the principle of reality does not admit non-existence and unreality by itself, then it is necessary by itself. Therefore, there is an essentially necessary reality, and the things that are real are in need of it and their reality subsists through it.' At this point, it becomes clear to those who reflect deeply that the reality of the essentially Necessary Being is necessary for man, and the arguments for His Existence are in fact [used] for drawing their attention [to It]. Another Version of Allamah Tabataba'i's Argument Allamah Tabataba'i expounds the above-mentioned argument elsewhere as follows: 'The reality of existence about whose subsistence there is no doubt, never admits negation and nonexistence. In other words, the reality of existence is unconditionally the reality of existence and does not become unreal unconditionally. As the universe is transient and each of its parts is susceptible to nonexistence [obliteration], it is not the same as that very reality that does not admit negation but rather through that very reality it comes to possess reality and without it, it has no share of existence and is nonexistent. Of course, it is not in the sense that reality should be united with things nor should it become incarnated in them nor should parts of reality be separated from it and join things but rather [it is] like light through which dark bodies become luminous and without which they are dark, and at the same time, this very example of light is not adequate to convey our purpose. In other words, It itself is the very reality, and the universe and its parts become real through It and without It they become null and void. The conclusion is that the universe and its parts, in terms of their existential independence and reality, depend upon a reality, which is the very same reality and which is the Reality by-itself.' This version has certain features: 1. It is not dependent upon any philosophical premises, that is, neither upon the premises of Mulla Sadra's argument nor even upon the premise of the argument of Sabzawari about the fundamentality of existence. Thus, it can be said that it has an original importance because it needs no philosophical or other premises, and for this reason, it can be considered the most succinct and, if assumed to be complete, the most solid of arguments. 2. This argument proves the unity of the Necessary Being as well as the existence of the Necessary Being, because with respect to Its essential absoluteness and infinitude, there will be no possibility of assuming a partner. If the reality of everything depends upon it, and if it itself is the very same Reality, no partner can be assumed.